The Battle of Lookout Mountain raged on 24 Nov 1863, as Federal Forces fought their way up Lookout Mountain, attempting to dislodge a smaller Confederate force at the top, from which position the confederates were besieging the city of Chattanooga with their artillery batteries.
The waymark coordinates are located at the Craven's House, site of some of the fiercest fighting as Union troops fought their way up Lookout Mountain.
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On November 24, Hooker had about 10,000 men in three divisions to operate against Lookout Mountain. Acknowledging that this was too large a force for a simple diversion, Grant authorized a more serious effort against the mountain, but did not agree to a full-scale assault. Hooker was ordered to "take the point only if his demonstration should develop its practicability."[18] Hooker ignored this subtlety and at 3 a.m. on November 24 ordered Geary "to cross Lookout Creek and to assault Lookout Mountain, marching down the valley and sweeping every rebel from it."
Hooker did not plan to attack Stevenson's Division on the top of the mountain, assuming that capturing the bench would make Stevenson's position untenable. His force would approach the bench from two directions: Whitaker's brigade would link up with Geary at Wauhatchie, while Grose's brigade and Osterhaus's division would cross Lookout Creek to the southeast. Both forces would meet near the Cravens house. Osterhaus's division was in support: Woods's brigade was assigned to cover Grose and cross the creek after him; Williamson's brigade was assigned to protect Hooker's artillery near the mouth of Lookout Creek.
Hooker arranged an impressive array of artillery to scatter the Confederate pickets and cover his advance. He had nine batteries set up near the mouth of Lookout Creek, two batteries from the Army of the Cumberland on Moccasin Point, and two additional batteries near Chattanooga Creek.
Geary's expected dawn crossing of Lookout Creek was delayed by high water until 8:30 a.m. First to cross the footbridge was Cobham's brigade, followed by Ireland's, which formed to Cobham's left and became the center of Geary's battle line. Candy's brigade then extended the Union left down to the base of the mountain. Whitaker's brigade followed in the rear. From 9:30 to 10:30 a.m, Geary's skirmishers advanced through the fog and mist that obscured the mountain. Contact was made with Walthall's pickets 1 mile southwest of Lookout Point. The Confederates were significantly outnumbered and could not resist the pressure, falling back but leaving a number behind to surrender. Hooker ordered an artillery bombardment to saturate the Confederate line of retreat, but the effect was minimized because of poor visibility and the fact that the two forces were almost on top of each other.
Much of the ground over which we advanced was rough beyond conception. It was covered with an untouched forest growth, seamed with the deep ravines, and obstructed with rocks of all sizes which had fallen from the frowning wall on our right. The ground passed over by our left was not quite so rough; but, taking the entire stretch of the mountain side traversed by our force ... it was undoubtedly the roughest battle field of the war.
The Union pursuit of the skirmishers was halted around 11:30 a.m. 300 yards southwest the point when Ireland and Cobham encountered Walthall's reserve southwest of the Cravens house. The two Confederate regiments repulsed Ireland's first attempt at assaulting their fieldworks. A second assault succeeded, enveloping and outnumbering the Confederates 4 to 1. Despite Walthall's attempt to rally his men, he could not prevent a disorderly retreat back toward the Cravens house. The Union brigades kept up their pursuit past the point and along the bench.
As Geary's men appeared below the point around noon, Candy's brigade advanced across the lower elevations of the mountain, clearing the enemy from the east bank of Lookout Creek. Hooker ordered Woods's and Grose's brigades to begin crossing the foot bridge over the creek. Woods moved east at the base of the mountain, Grose moved up the slope. These movements isolated part of Walthall's Brigade and the entire 34th Mississippi was forced to surrender, along with 200 men from Moore's picket line.
Cravens house
Moore was reluctant to take action. At 9:30 he had sent a message to Jackson asking where he should deploy his brigade and Jackson's reply at 11 a.m. expressed his frustration that Moore had seemingly forgotten the plan to defend the line at the Cravens house. Peter Cozzens criticized Jackson's poor performance in leading the defense:
There was bungling aplenty among the Confederate commanders on Lookout Mountain that day, but no one displayed greater negligence than did Jackson. He remained glued to his headquarters ... near the base of the cliff. He was nearly a mile from the line he had been charged to defend. In his report of the battle, Jackson tried to excuse his dereliction of duty by arguing that his headquarters was a good spot from which to receive both commands from Stevenson on the summit and reports from the front line. That may have been true, but his presence was badly needed nearer the Cravens house. Jackson lacked even the presence of mind to call for reinforcements; Stevenson had to offer them.
When Stevenson heard the fighting between Walthall and Geary, he ordered Pettus to take three regiments from the summit to assist Jackson. By this time, Moore's Alabamians were moving up amidst Walthall's retreating men, and they fired on Ireland's New Yorkers from 100 yards. Unable to see the size of the force resisting it through the fog, the Union men retreated beyond a stone wall. Moore's 1,000 men took positions in the rifle pits facing the wall and waited for the inevitable counterattack. Ireland's men were too exhausted to make an immediate move. As Whitaker's brigade arrived after 1 p.m., they stepped over Ireland's men and rushed into the attack. Candy's brigade was moving up the mountain side on Whitaker's left, followed by the brigades of Woods and Grose. Moore could see that he was being significantly outflanked on the right and chose to fall back rather than be surrounded.
All of the Union brigades, including Ireland's tired men, began the pursuit. Hooker was concerned that his lines were becoming intermingled and confused by the fog and the rugged ground and they were tempting defeat if the Confederates brought up reinforcements in the right place. He ordered Geary to halt for the day, but Geary was too far behind his troops to stop them. Hooker wrote, "Fired by success, with a flying, panic-stricken enemy before them, they pressed impetuously forward."
Moore's brigade was able to escape in the fog and Walthall had adequate time to form a rough defensive line 3–400 yards south of the Cravens house. His 600 men took cover behind boulders and fallen trees and made enough of a racket to dissuade Whitaker's men from moving against them. By this time Pettus's brigade of three Alabama regiments had descended from the summit and came to Walthall's assistance after 2 p.m.
Hooker sent to Grant alternating messages of panic and bluster. At 1:25 p.m., he wrote that the "conduct of all the troops has been brilliant, and the success has far exceeded my expectations. Our loss has not been severe, and of prisoners I should judge that we had not less than 2,000." At around 3 p.m., he wrote "Can hold the line I am now on; can't advance. Some of my troops out of ammunition; can't replenish." Responding to a plaintive message sent from Whitaker, General Thomas approved the transfer of Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin's brigade (XIV Corps) to aid Hooker. (Carlin was delayed for hours attempting to cross the river and reported to Geary at 7 p.m., playing no role in the combat.) But by sunset, a confident Hooker informed Grant that he intended to move into Chattanooga Valley as soon as the fog lifted. He signaled "In all probability the enemy will evacuate tonight. His line of retreat is seriously threatened by my troops."
Bragg responded to a request by Stevenson for reinforcements by sending Col. J.T. Holtzclaw's brigade under the condition that it be used only to cover a Confederate withdrawal from Lookout Mountain, ordering Stevenson at 2:30 p.m. to withdraw to the east side of Chattanooga Creek. Stevenson was reluctant to break contact until his troops on the summit could escape on the Summertown Road into the Chattanooga Valley. The brigades of Walthall, Pettus, and Moore were ordered to hold on for the rest of the afternoon. For hours through the afternoon and into the night, the six Alabama regiments under Pettus and Moore fought sporadically with the Union troops through dense fog, neither side able to see more than a few dozen yards ahead nor make any progress in either direction."