Located at the corner of Ship Mechanic Row and Tremont Streets, this black, white, and maroon mosaic is made of hexagon and square tiles. It is overall a circle, bound by a black metal border. The border bears the manufacturers name - Hartwell Ironworks, Houston, Texas.
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ROYAL BAR
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The only information I could find about the Royal Bar was legal proceeding concerning the sale of the business in 1909, in The Southwestern Reporter. (via Google Books)
THE SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER
VOLUME 119,
CONTAINING ALL THE CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME AND APPELLATE COURTS OF ARKANSAS,
KENTUCKY, MISSOURI, TENNESSEE,
AND TEXAS,
PERMANENT EDITION.
JUNE 16—JULY 14, 1909.
ST. PAUL
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
1909
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KOPPERL V. STANDARD DISTILLING CO.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. May 19, 1909.)
1. ESTOPPEL ($ 55*)—EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
To establish an equitable estoppel against one, it must appear that another relied in good
faith on representations made by the former, and was led thereby to change his position for
the worse.
[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. $55.*]
2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCEs (§ 186*)—PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE – TITLE ACQUIRED.
A purchaser for value, without notice of any fraudulent intent of the vendor to defraud
creditors, is not chargeable with the fraud, though the vendor was insolvent.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Fraudulent ##". Cent. Dig. $ 590; Dec. Dig. § Appeal from Galveston County Court; Geo. E. Mann, Judge.
Action by the Standard Distilling Company against H. B. Kopperl. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered. Mart H. Royston, for appellant. P. A. Drouilhet, for appellee.
FLY, J. Appellee Sued appellant in the justice's court to recover $178.35 for goods sold and delivered to Gus B. Franck, and which indebtedness it was alleged was assumed by appellant. Appellee recovered judgment in the justice's court, and, on appeal to the county court, judgment was again rendered in favor of appellee for its claim. The facts are that on August 6, 1907, appellant bought from Gus B. Franck, for $4,200, all the property located in a saloon in Galveston, known as the “Royal Bar,” consisting of a stock of liquors, cigars, beer, and waters, and fixtures of every description, including glassware, mirrors, electric fans, cash registers, and furniture. On the next morning appellant published the following notice in the Galveston News:
“Notice is hereby given that H. B. Kopperl has bought the Royal Bar heretofore owned by Gus B. Franck, and will not be responsible for any bills or claims against Gus B. Franck after August 22d.”
On the following morning appellant published in the same paper a notice that he would not be responsible for any claims against Franck. A salesman for appellee saw the first notice on same day it was published in Beaumont, but did not see the last one. He says he would have gone to Galveston at once to look after appellee's claim if he had not thought appellant good for it. He did go to Galveston a few days thereafter, and called on appellant for a settlement, who refused to pay. The salesman could not find Franck in Galveston at that time.
It was not alleged nor proved that Franck did not have other property, nor that the debt could not be collected from him. It was not shown that the first notice prevented appellee from collecting the account, nor that it was placed in a worse position by the publication of the notice. Appellant had not assumed payment of any claims against Franck.There was no evidence tending to show that the sale was made for the purpose of hindering or delaying creditors of Franck in the Collection of their debts. The evidence failed to establish an equitable estoppel against appellant, because it did not appear that appellee relied in good faith upon the notice, and was led thereby to change its position for the worse. There can be no estoppel in this case, unless the publication of the notice caused appellee to desist from efforts to collect his debt, and was thereby caused to lose the debt. Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 804-812; Wortham v. Thompson, 81 Tex. 348, 16 S. W. 1059.
There was no testimony tending to show that Franck sold his property with intent to defraud creditors; and, if there had been, there was no evidence that appellant had notice of the fraudulent intent of the Vendor, and it is not claimed that appellant did not pay value for the property. A purchaser is not affected by the fraudulent intention of his vendor of which he had no notice. Even if Franck had been insolvent, which did not appear, a purchaser for value, without notice of any fraudulent intention on the part of the vendor, would not be liable. Howell v. Mars,
82 Tex. 493, 17 S. W. 370; Kraus v. Haas, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 665, 25 S. W. 1025, approved 86 Tex. 687, 27 S. W. 256.
The judgment is reversed, and judgment here rendered in favor of appellant.