This tombstone stands in the Downes family plot in Glenwood Cemetery (north sector), Crockett TX. It memorializes the sacrifice of 1Lt. Edward E, Downes, US Army, the son of James Edward Downes (whose grave is marked with a state historic marker).
The tombstone reads as follows:
"In memory of Edward E Downes, 1st Lieut., Co. H, First U.S. Infantry, who fell in battle June 23, 1901 while leading a detachment of enlisted men near Saledo Samap, P. I.
His body is interred in US Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia."
From the Arlington Cemetery website: (
visit link)
"Edward Elbert Downes
First Lieutenant, United States Army
Born at Crockett, Texas, June 20, 1875 he was killed in action while leading a detachment of Company H, 1st United States Infantry near Saludd, Samar, Philippine Islands, on June 23, 1901.
He is buried in Section 1 of Arlington National Cemetery.
Edward Elbert Downes of Texas
Appointed from Texas, Cadet, United States Military Academy, 15 June 1896 to 25 Jan 1898;
Second Lieutenant, 1st U. S. Infantry, 9 July 1898
First Lieutenant, 2 March 1899
Killed 23 June 1901 in action at Salcedo, Philippine Islands
LIEUTENANT E. E. DOWNES KILLED
WASHINGTON, July 1, 1901- General MacArthur cables to the War Department that First Lieutenant Edward E. Downes, Company H, First Infantry, was killed in Southern Samar. Downes was appointed to West Point from Texas in 1896, but in 1898 entered the service as a Second Lieuenant without graduating from the Military Academy.
Edward Elbert Downes of Texas
Appointed from Texas, Cadet, United States Military Academy, 15 June 1896 to 25 January 1898
Second Lieutenant, 9th U. S. Infantry, 9 July 1898
First Lieutenant, 2 March 1899
Killed 23 June 1901 in action as Salcedo, Philippine Islands
DOWNES, EDWARD E
LT 1ST US INF
DATE OF DEATH: 06/23/1901
BURIED AT: SITE 403
ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY"
Excepts from Brian Linn's book, The Phillipine War, reproduced fron the website America's First Forgotten War contins some context and details about the circumstances of 1Lt Downes' death: (
visit link)
"The island of Samar is located south-east of Luzon on the eastern side of the archipelago. It remained a backwater in the war for quite some time. Resistance was "light and unorganized" and Otis did not put much importance on garrisoning any large contingent of forces on the island. By July 1900, the U.S. had tenuously held only the port cities of Calbayog and Catbalogan in the western half of the island.
However, Samar would become what Linn described as the best known incident of the war, the
Balangiga Massacre and Jacob H. Smith's "howling wilderness." Extremely controversial at the time, the incident on Samar became lodged in both popular and the academic mind as the microcosm of the entire war. Furthermore, the many textbooks view the entire war through the prism of these final regional conflicts. Thus a good portion of the public accounts and perceptions of the Philippine War, even to this day, revolve primarily around the Massacre.
U.S. Marine Corps lore in Samar had become symbolic of the perceived sacrifice and heroism performed by these soldiers during the conflict. This aside, it is one of the greatest historical fallacies of the entire war that this tragic occurrence is seen as representative of both U.S. Army pacification and Filipino resistance. The task of the following analysis is to uncover the truth behind the incident on Samar.
By May 1901, Gen. MacArthur, now in command of the 8th Corps, had decided to transfer Samar back to Gen. Hughes and the Department of the Visayas. Hughes was instructed to take drastic measures against Samar's ferocious rebels that were under the command of the insurgent leader Vicente Lubkan. They had been conducting raids from the interior that were similar in nature to those that were being done on the other Visayan Islands. Hughes concluded that the situation had indeed begun to spin out of control due to the lack of American manpower.
The aforementioned scorched-earth campaign was the method of choice for Hughes as he sought to starve the guerillas out by destroying the countryside's livestock and crops. The naval blockade around Samar was also heightened. Civilian sea vessels were seized save for those used exclusively for fishing. Of primary concern for Hughes at this time was the illicit smuggling that was occurring in and out of Samar. Most of the activity was coming from the island of Leyte which lye only several miles across the narrow San Juanico Strait. Leyte had recently been turned over to Taft's Philippine Commission in May of 1901 and as a result, MacArthur pulled the all remaining forces off of this island.
In an effort to stem the tide of illicit smuggling into and out of Samar, Hughes stationed a battalion of the 9th Infantry along the coastal towns of Balangiga, Lanang, Santa Rita and Basey. They were also ordered on extended patrols up the Oras River in order to trash the country sides and deny the enemy refuge and sustenance. One particular patrol under the command of Captain Mark L. Hersey claimed to have burned houses by the hundreds for the next twenty miles. The American garrison at Laguan estimated that they alone had destroyed 145 houses and 5,025 bushels of rice all in only one month.
In August of 1901, Captain Henry Jackson and the 1st Infantry moved completely across the northern half of the island in an effort to destroy Lubkan's rearguard. They succeeded in capturing several members of the insurgent leader's family as well as most of his papers.
By the summer's end, Samar's interior was devoid of sustenance not only for the insurgents but for many of its peaceful inhabitants. Hughes's policy of destruction warranted the need to construct resettlement zones for the displaced and war-ravaged locals. Thus the coastal cities were teeming with starving and bewildered Filipinos. Mass starvation was becoming a very real possibility, even in the pacified coastal towns. Hughes, sensing an impending calamity, loosened the grip of the naval blockades and allowed for limited trade with Leyte. Agents were put in charge to deal with the Commission in Leyte in order to secure the much needed provisions for the cities.
Samar's fearsome reputation was born in June 1901 when a twenty-six man patrol under Lt. Edward E. Downes attempted to traverse the narrow peninsula at the extreme southern tip of the island. It consisted primarily of hills, mountains and dense jungles and had not yet been mapped by the U.S. military.
During the midst of their destructive path northwards, they suddenly found themselves lost in the dense thickets. The non-commissioned officers urged Downes to make haste for the coast in order to regroup and determine their location. Downes declined and ordered the soldiers on when all of a sudden, a horde of bolomen appeared and chaos erupted for several minutes as the Filipino swordsmen slashed away at close range. Two Americans died and another two were wounded.
Among the dead was Downes who was fatally stabbed in the hand-to-hand fighting. The survivors were badly shaken and abandoned their dead and forged on without their leader. It wasn't for three more days without food or water until they were found. Hughes's strategy of pillaging and burning seemed to have increased the ferocity and desperation of the resistance.
These types of ambushes were beginning to become the norm in Samar. Insurgents attempted to cut American supply lines and raided and terrorized the outlying towns. Hughes's troops in Samar were stretched dangerously thin and the rebels knew it. An 'us-against-them' mentality was prevalent amongst the U.S. troops.
Everything finally came to a head on September 28, 1901 in the small coastal town of Balangiga where the seventy-four man garrison of Company C, 9th Infantry was stationed. In the first weeks of September, Captain Thomas W. Connell ordered a misguided project to clean up the town. He had concentrated dozens of Filipinos in tents at the city's outskirts in an effort to clean up and rebuild the town. Hundreds of insurgents began infiltrating into the city. Some came as laborers, as members of a wedding party, or even dressed as women. The insurgents had infiltrated the work camp.
The soldiers began their Sunday breakfast early on that morning of 28 September when the local police chief approached an American sentry and suddenly pulled out a bolo and cut him down. A mob of bolomen charged out of the town's church and the tents and they went directly for Company C. The soldiers began scurrying, some nearly naked. Connell and his subordinate, Lt. Edward A. Bumpus were killed. The desperate soldiers began grabbing whatever they could to defend themselves whether it was a Krag, kitchen implements and even cans of food. Several members of Company C actually managed to flee for the beach and the barcas that would ferry them away to the near-by garrison at Basey.
They left behind 100 rifles, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, and large supplies of medicine, food and equipment. Furthermore, forty-eight of their comrades were killed in the sneak attack. Hughes was furious and blamed Connell for his overly conciliatory and nurturing approach. Hughes was quoted as stating that Connell treated the Filipinos with compassion, and they responded with treachery.
Linn described the sequence of events as duplicitous and barbaric and captured letters later revealed that the event had been planned for months. A varying array of accounts of the encounter began to circulate. The Americans claimed that the Filipinos mutilated corpses. A heroic slant was molded out of the American accounts. The insurgent leader denied this claim and also declared that Company C had been needlessly antagonizing the villagers by stealing, brutality and at least one rape. Combine this with the famine-like conditions on Samar and a recipe for disaster in most definitely in order."
Linn's book on the Phillipine War won a Society for Military History Distinguished Book Award: (
visit link)