A bronze statue of Marine Lt. Gen. John Lejeune captures the essence of his Marine toughness and pride. The statue stands at the Louisiana Memorial in the Riverfront Plaza area downtown Baton Rouge.
He was born in Louisiana, and Camp Lejeune was named in his honor. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
The plaque at the base of the statue reads as follows:
"LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN ARCHER LEJEUNE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Major General Commanding Second Division
American Expeditionary Force
France World War I
1918-1919
Major General Commandant
United States Marine Corps
1920-1929"
For more on this extraordinary Marine, see the fascinating article "The Vision of John A. Lejeune, by Joseph D. Dodd - published April 1962," which we will briefly excerpt below. Link: (
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"The Corps' unique amphibious mission was charted a half century ago by its 13th Commandant and founder of the Marine Corps Association.
General John Archer Lejeune was the quiet one. Not a man to create a legend, nor even to contribute to one, he none-the-less etched a deep mark in Corps history. The etching was personal, inscribed unselfishly in the most devoted interests of the Marine Corps. It was the heritage of this quiet, unassuming Marine, probably the least colorful leader of all, to contribute more to the traditional linage of the Marine Corps than any other man.
For John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant, the Corps was more than a profession; it represented a vision-and the vision was the landing from ships of the men and weapons of war to gain a toehold on a hostile shore. This was the vision that became a highly refined mission accredited by the Congress of the United States. The mission is the amphibious attack.
John A. Lejeune did not, of course, conceive the amphibious concept. Nor did it evolve to grace during his tenure. He retired in 1929; the first successful amphibious attack came many years later preceding by three months his death at 75 on. 20 Nov 42. But standing today on Onslow Beach or Vieques, he would surely know that his dream had been interpreted in the most splendid fashion. . . .
General Lejeune assumed command of the Second Division, A. E. F., on 8 July, 1918. Contrary to popular belief he was not the first Marine io command the Army division. The division headquarters had been partly organized in the United States and partly in France. BGen C. A. Doyen, USMC, assumed command on 26 October, 1917, and remained so until relieved by Army MajGen Omar Bundy two weeks later. Lejeune UOS the first Marine to lead an Army division in combat. He brilliantly conducted his division, a mixed unit of soldiers and Marines, in successful operations at Thiaucourt, Massif Blanc Mont, St. Mihiel and on the West Bank of the Meuse. About this latter action, the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Gen Black Jack Pershing, A. E. F. commander, said: ". . . his division was directed with such sound military judgment that it broke and held, by the vigor and speed of its attacks, enemy lines which had been considered impregnable."
For his services as Commanding General of the Second Division, from July 1918 until July 1919, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, both Army and Navy; the Croix de Guerre, with Palm; and the Cross of a Commander of the Legion of Honor.
He also got an unsatisfactory fitness report from an Army Corps commander whose sleep he had disturbed. It came about like this:
Not long after the Armistice the Second Division was transferred from V Corps to III Corps for the purpose of taking part in the march to the Rhine where it would garrison the Coblenz bridgehead. Fierce fighting in the rain and mud during the final 11 days of the war had extracted its toll. The men were exhausted and Lejeune and his officers were bending their energies rebuilding the division, including the issue of new equipment and clothing. While thus engaged, Gen Lejeune got a call citing immediate marching orders. "Who's speaking," he asked? "Clark of Emerson," came the reply. Lejeune knew the caller, a member of the III Corps' staff. Emerson was the code name for Corps headquarters. Clark explained that the Commander-in-Chief had decided that an American division should start the March to the Rhine from Stenay. Since all of the bridges north of Dun-Sac-Meuse were down, Lejeune knew the nearest Meuse crossing meant a march of 40 kilometers, and another 40 kilometers back to Stenay once the bridge was crossed. He demurred.
"I told him that we had already rebuilt the bridge at Pouilly and could cross there." When the voice from Emerson explained that crossing the bridge at Pouilly meant passing through German lines to reach Stenay, a breach strictly forbidden by Marshall Foch, Lejeune suggested the bridge at Stenay be repaired, citing the exhausted condition of his men and the need for more time to rebuild. Col Clark said he lacked authority to change the order, that the III Corps commander was asleep and he did not care to awaken him. Replied Lejeune: "It is better to disturb one general than to have 25,000 sick and exhausted men march 60 kilometers unnecessarily. I will drive over to Corps headquarters and awaken him myself." The order was modified but the Corps commander never forgot and later assessed the Second Division as lacking in personal appearance, military bearing, discipline and in the conditions of its animals and transportation. It took an inspection by Pershing's inspector-general to set the record straight. Some observers considered the criticism incongruous in light of Lejeune's combat achievements. To this he replied: "None of these achievements, nor all of them together, serve as a shield to my reputation."
Commenting on the incident later, Gen Lejeune explained his actions this way:
"I endeavor constantly to be a leader of men rather than a driver of men. In conformity with this effort I never nagged the men and never bawled them out. I always endeavored to be just and show no favoritism. The few who were guilty of being offenders were severely punished but the treatment of officers and men who did their duty was always kind and considerate. I never hesitated to protect the officers and men under my command from unnecessary hardships and from unjust treatment, even though I had to be insubordinate in doing so."
. . .
That Lejeune was an effective leader without resort to cajolery or demeaning manner is part of the Second Division's combat record which, under its Marine commander, began at St. Mihiel.. .
The Division's greatest hour under its quietly brilliant leader was yet to come. This was the Battle of Meuse-Argonne. Personally selected by the 1st Army commander on the basis of recent performance, the Second Division had a vital place in the plan of attack. The salient feature of the attack was to drive a wedge through Landreset-St. George to the vicinity of Fesse. If this could be accomplished the backbone of hostile resistance west of the Meuse would be broken. The Germans would have to retreat to the east of the river where they would be vulnerable to the 1st American Army.
The Second Division was chosen to carry out this main blow and did so by achieving the desired results in every particular on the first day of attack (1 Nov 1918) clearing the enemy all the way to Fesse, a distance of nine kilometers. The corps commander, MajGen C. P. Summerall, considered the advance one of the most remarkable achievements of the war.
The day after the battle, the Division commander published an order that indicates that even quiet-spoken men can be moved by battle to stirring rhetoric: "When the history of America's part in winning this war is written, the renown of the Second Division will stand out pre-eminent. Let us press on and destroy the enemy!"
Nine days later the enemy cried "uncle" and Lejeune led his division on the post-Armistice March to the Rhine, to the Coblenz bridgehead, where it remained until receiving sailing orders for home seven months later. The receipt of orders once again moved Lejeune to impassioned prose: "The curtain has fallen on the last act of the greatest drama in the history of the world. . .
Lejeune's vision of a small, precision-trained amphibious assault force never quite materialized during his career which ended voluntarily 5 Mar 1929. Military analysts and historians have offered several reasons for the slow acceptance of the ship-to-shore concept. Lack of money and highly-placed Navy interest were probably the main holdbacks. Then, as now, the Marine Corps carried out its work within a restrained budget; the focus of Navy interest was on warships, not landing craft. Also global commitments in China, Nicaragua and Haiti hamstrung any serious amphibious training efforts.
The fulfillment of the vision began to take shape with the publication of Tentative Manual for Landing Operations published at Quantico in 1935 (see School for Doctrine, page GO) . Then, in 1939, BGen Holland M. Smith, destined to be the first CG, FMFPac, was given the 1st Marine Brigade and the mission of training its Marines in ship-to-shore operations. From a base at Guantanamo Bay, Navy and Marines blueprinted the WWII Pacific war, naval gunfire support, combat loading, net operations; and experimented with landing craft.
That it was left to other hands to implement his dream is of no matter. This, too, was in accord with the Lejeune philosophy of esprit de Corps and the tangible benefits that could derive from an intangible substance. This same philosophy is evident in an early Marine Corps GAZETTE: prospectus:
"What we need is some means of bringing our officers closer together, as well as an organized system of education. The publication of articles prepared by officers, together with the criticisms by other officers, will offer an incentive to study professional subjects . . . in this way the knowledge and experience of each officer will be available to every other officer."
Lejeune is also the author of the paragraph in the Marine Corps Manual, repeated throughout the Corps on 10 November, that relates to the "high name of distinction and soldierly repute" that each generation of Marine inherits from its predecessor. Which is why every war produces its Dan Daleys, its John Basilones and Jimmy Howards.
Gen Lejeune best described the heritage as congenital. In recalling to memory the exploits of his Marines in France, he recounted an incident of an earlier war, the Battle of Wagram, in which Marshall Ney, standing on a hilltop in plain view of the attacking regiments, said to his orderly "Hear them shout, see them charge! It's in their blood."
In this same way, Gen Lejeune considered his Marines, and those who would follow: "Once a Marine, always a Marine. It's in their blood!"
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